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TO : The Ambassador September 26, 1966

THRU : DCM - Mr. Martin

FROM : Science Officer - Mr. Wendel

SUBJECT: Reported TGS Ambitions for Development of Atomic Weapon

A source considered reliable from the Turkish Scientific Research Council by telephone requested an appointment at my office September 23. He appeared within a half hour and after mentioning a routine matter connected with an international conference, with obvious agitation, disclosed a matter which he had learned just the evening before from the General Director of the M.T.A. The M.T.A. Director (Alpan) had been asked to cooperate with General Tulga and Professor Omer Inonu (Professor of Physics at METU) in a Turkish program to develop an "Atomic Bomb". Source thought that such a program was one which would absorb too much of Turkish scientific and financial resources. Without noticeable rancor or desire to impugn the subject, he mentioned that Professor Inonu had been to Russia last summer. When I observed that this plan of General Tulga's was probably secret in view of its obvious military and political implications, he said he realized that but wanted me to know of it nevertheless.

Comment: Some indications support the possible credibility of this story:

1. Repeated Turkish assertions that a 200 mega-watt nuclear reactor is planned for Istanbul.
2. The emphasis and expenditures of the M.T.A. during the last six or seven years on uranium exploration resulting in indicated reserves of 300-600 tons of uranium in low-grade ore deposits.
3. The delaying and haggling tactics of the Turkish negotiators during discussions of the extension of the bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of atomic energy which primarily concerned the transfer of safeguards responsibility from the U.S.A. to the International Atomic Energy Agency

META - Middle East Technical University  
 MTA - Minerals Research and Exploration Institute

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 General Tulga - Deputy Chief, TGS

under a trilateral agreement. Of particular interest were reservations expressed at times regarding the applicability of these safeguards to new reactor facilities -- a point which was not relevant to the present agreement and which, as the U.S. representatives suggested, could be covered by a subsequent power reactor bilateral agreement.

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